Review on Canadian Forces Recruiting Process Part 2

Findings and Recommendations
General Findings

Overall, I found that the Canadian Forces recruiting system is working and that the military’s recruiting targets are, for the most part, being met. I am also encouraged by the emphasis currently being placed on recruiting by Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff. Indeed, I hope that recent initiatives implemented as part of Operation Connection will be adopted as the standard for the Canadian Forces’ approach to recruiting in the future.

However, this review has also found that there is significant room for improvement. I am concerned, in particular, by the number of individuals that my office has come across as part of this review who have quit the process – or were very close to quitting the process – as a result of an unsatisfactory experience during one of the recruiting phases.

In order to ensure that it does not routinely lose the services of talented Canadians interested in a military career, the Canadian Forces must address a number of specific issues in the current recruiting system.

Table of Contents


Issue One – Client Centered Services/Communications
Background

A majority of complainants interviewed by the Office of the Ombudsman during this review spoke of the frustration that they had experienced when they tried to obtain information from their local Recruiting Centre about the status of their files. In many of these cases, applicants not only had to initiate contact, they normally had to do it numerous times before receiving a response. Indeed, one applicant told investigators: “I had to call the Recruit Centre seven days in a row before anyone called me back to give me an update on my file and every time I did call I spoke to a different person. Eventually I just gave up. I now have a very good job and no longer have any interest in joining the Canadian Forces”.
Analysis

Although Ombudsman investigators were informed by the majority of Canadian Forces recruiters that regular contact is maintained with all applicants, investigators could find no direction at either the local or Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Headquarters levels to support this assertion. There is no evidence that could be found that a ‘standard’ exists or is in place, nor that applicants are provided with any information other than the telephone number of their local Recruiting Centre if they had additional questions.

The Canadian face behind the recruiting targets...

A complainant applied to the Canadian Forces in August 2003 under the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan while attending his final semester in an Aviation Pilot Training program at a well-known Institute of Technology. In September 2003, the complainant completed the Canadian Forces Aptitude Test and medical parts one and two at his local Recruiting Centre. During the second part of the medical testing, a Physician Assistant (PA) expressed concern about a possible heart murmur and what the PA interpreted as reconstructive surgery on one of the complainant’s knees as a result of a hockey injury.

The complainant advised the PA that he had undergone (and passed) an ECG as part of an aviation medical that he had had the previous year. There had been no evidence of a heart murmur. He also explained that he had not had reconstructive surgery on his knee. Instead, a surgeon had only performed an exploratory procedure to ensure that the knee had healed properly. The Physician Assistant advised the complainant that he would require a doctor’s letter to that effect.

The complainant obtained the documentation in October 2003 and it was forwarded to the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Medical Staff. In December, the complainant received correspondence stating that he was considered a medical liability due to the issue of his knee. As a result, he was asked to supply additional information from an orthopaedic surgeon regarding the surgery that was done on his knee. In February 2004, the complainant received the required documentation giving him a clean bill of health. This was sent to the Medical Staff in March. He was told by the local Recruiting Centre to expect a response in 7-8 weeks. After waiting 8 weeks, the complainant contacted the Recruiting Centre and was informed that, although he was now considered medically fit, he had missed the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan entry deadline – a deadline that he had never been informed of.

Although extremely discouraged by the amount of information that he was required to provide as a result of a ‘misinterpretation’ of his medical information and the lack of communication from the local Recruiting Centre about the entry deadline, the complainant is still interested in a career in the Canadian Forces.
Summary and Recommendations

In the critical area of communications with applicants, it is clear that the Canadian Forces – and the local Recruiting Centres in particular – are experiencing shortcomings. For many applicants, contact with their local Recruiting Centres is their first, and only, real experience with the Canadian Forces. And if they are not well served, many applicants will simply decide that it is not worth their time or effort to pursue a career in the Canadian Forces. Throughout this review, the Ombudsman and Ombudsman investigators came across a number of these cases.

Whenever Canadians decide to quit the military recruiting process out of frustration, there are at least two likely consequences. First, the Canadian Forces loses some of Canada’s best and brightest, including those individuals discouraged from joining the military by the frustrated applicant. Second, a frustrating experience will very likely shape the way in which the discouraged applicant – and many others – view the Canadian Forces and the Government of Canada as a whole.

Maintaining regular and meaningful contact with applicants throughout the recruiting process must not only become a priority for recruiting staff, it must become the norm. Based on the evidence gathered, this does not appear to be the case. Given the frustration expressed by many of the complainants, and the lack of a definitive policy in this area, a more structured way of ensuring that this takes place is sorely needed.

As a point of reference for the level and quality of communications – and, indeed, overall service – that should be offered to applicants, the Government of Canada has launched the Service Improvement Initiative requiring government departments and agencies to establish and implement service standards. Once established, federal departments and agencies are required to monitor their performance against these standards and to use them to manage client expectations and thus improve user satisfaction.

A review of corporate and public sector entities conducted by Treasury Board Secretariat to ascertain what service standards were in the public domain and thus accessible by the average consumer, Service Canada was considered to be at the forefront. This organization is responsible for providing Canadians with information on government services and benefits, and by visiting their website (at http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca) any client can easily determine the type of service that they can expect to receive. The website includes a Service Charter that outlines the goal of the organization, what it provides, its commitment to its clients, how to contact the organization, and the standard of service that clients can – and should – expect.

In order to ensure that skilled Canadians – indeed, all Canadian applicants – do not routinely become frustrated with the military recruiting process, Recruiting Centres must truly become ‘client focused’ organizations. More specifically, service standards, like those of Service Canada, must be developed, implemented, and clearly communicated to recruiters and to applicants.

Recommendation One

I recommend that:

The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group develop and implement comprehensive service standards explaining exactly what clients can expect from their Recruiting Centres. The standards should include, but not be limited to:

*

A standard timeframe (48 hours, for instance) in which applicants can expect to receive replies to their inquiries, be they by telephone, written communication or e-mail;
*

The type and quality of service applicants can expect;
*

How to contact someone within the recruiting system should applicants have a question; and
*

Information, in writing, on how applicants can file complaints with someone outside of their local Recruiting Centre. These complaints must then be dealt with in a specified period of time.

Once developed, these standards must be promulgated and communicated to both applicants and recruiters. They should not only appear on the Canadian Forces website, they should be prominently displayed in all Recruiting Centres.

As required under Treasury Board Policy, the service standards, once developed, must be monitored to ensure that they are being implemented. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation should also be used to assess resource levels and determine if adjustments are required to policies and procedures if service standards are not being met.

In order to do this, a performance measurement system is required to capture the qualitative and quantitative data that must be analyzed and reported on. This will require additional resources. It will also require dedicated personnel who can develop the appropriate measures and who can then monitor, adjust and report on those measures in a meaningful, value-added way to the Canadian Forces. And to be most effective, these measures must be available to decision-makers on an ongoing and timely basis.

Recommendation Two

I recommend that:

The Chief of Military Personnel provide the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group with the resources required to put in place a Standards Cell, whose responsibility would be to monitor and report on performance measures, and to develop best practices and lessons learned for the benefit of the entire organization.

As a way to help ensure better (including more timely) communications with applicants, the standing up of a recruiting ‘call centre’ in the summer of 2006 by the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group is an important initiative and a positive development. It is another major area, however, where proper client focused service standards must be developed, implemented, monitored and reported on.

Recommendation Three

I recommend that:

The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group develop, implement, monitor and report on client service standards for their recruiting ‘call centre’.

Finally, in order to make the recruiting system more immediately accessible to applicants, the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group should also make Recruiting Centres available outside the regular business working hours (see recommendation eighteen).

Table of Contents


Issue Two – Command and Control
Background

During this review of the recruiting system, it became evident that the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group was responsible for six distinct sub-components of the overall recruiting process. However, it also became clear that several of the sub-processes were either wholly or partly under the control (or authority) of another organization within the Canadian Forces. In some cases, this was due to the centralization of resources; in other cases, it was a question of government or departmental policy.

Regardless of the rationale for this state of being, the task of the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group is complicated by the current arrangement. Fundamentally, it is impossible to assign accountability for the success or failure of the Canadian Forces recruiting system to the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group when the Commander does not have the authority over several aspects (or components) of that system.

The current Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group and his staff have been able to develop personal (and positive) working relations with the other parts of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces that have a role to play in the successful outcome of the military recruiting process. Nonetheless, there are no guarantees that, as personalities and priorities change, this will remain the case. And this could lead to problems and disruptions in the overall recruiting system.
Analysis

An essential element of success for any organization is its ability to effectively command and control the resources allocated for the accomplishment of a specific mission or outcome. When an organization is given responsibility for a specific mission or outcome without being provided with the necessary authority, inefficiencies often result. More significantly, this situation may lead to problems between organizations and adversely affect the accomplishment of the mission or outcome.

There are a number of specific areas in the military recruiting system, considered critical to the broader recruiting effort, over which the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group does not have authority. These are:

* Recruit advertising is the responsibility of Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs).
* The medical file review process is the responsibility of Canadian Forces Health Service.
* The Enhanced Reliability (security) Checks are conducted by the Deputy Provost Marshal Security with the assistance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service.

It is important to note that a number of concerns brought forward by complainants during the review were related to the medical and security processes – areas, in large part, outside the authority of the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group. These issues are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
Summary and Recommendations

It is beyond the scope of this review to analyze or comment on issues of efficiency or cost savings associated with the centralization of the responsibility for specific parts of the Canadian Forces recruiting system. What does fall under this review, however, is the fact that the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group has responsibility for Canadian Forces recruiting efforts without having the requisite authority (or, in military terms, command and control) over all of the various components of the broader recruiting process.

In an ideal situation, the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group would have under his or her direct command all of the authorities and resources needed to attract applicants and to take them from the point of their first contact with the military to the enrolment stage. Wherever possible, the Canadian Forces should strive for this ideal. Failing this, it is imperative that the separation of the current authorities and responsibilities related to the recruiting process be very well defined and communicated. Otherwise, there cannot be true accountability.

Recommendation Four

I recommend that:

The lines of responsibility and authority for the military recruiting process be identified and/or clarified and communicated to all implicated organizations in the most effective manner.

Once the lines of responsibility and authority are identified and/or clarified, the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group’s requirements and expectations of other ‘service providers’ must be defined, articulated and formalized. Military recruiting is a top priority for the Government of Canada and the Canadian Forces, and all ‘service providers’ must provide the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group with the services that they need to succeed.

Recommendation Five

I recommend that:

Client Service Agreements be developed (where they do not exist) and formalized between the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group and all ‘service providers’. These agreements should establish clear expectations and service standards, including performance measures and indicators, and they should be adhered to in a rigorous way.

Finally, ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the service agreements is important to ensuring that they are functioning properly, meeting established expectations and that adjustments are made as circumstances warrant.

Recommendation Six

I recommend that:

The Chief of Military Personnel develop performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of the service agreements, including the communications between groups, and to identify when changes are required.

Table of Contents


Issue Three – Component Transfer
Background

A significant number of complainants that contacted the Office of the Ombudsman raised concerns about the Component Transfer process – a process under which serving members of the Canadian Forces can transfer between components or sub-components of the military. The majority of these complaints came from Reservists seeking to transfer to the Regular Force. Although already considered members of the Canadian Forces, Reservists were required to follow the same process as any other applicant; in addition, however, they were also required to obtain a recommendation from their commanding officer supporting their application.

In terms of the Component Transfer process, the most frequent complaint involved excessive delays. Indeed, as a result of these delays, many applicants were not able to submit their files to the appropriate occupational selection boards by the established deadlines, thus resulting in the applicant not being considered for selection.

Other concerns were from those members seeking a transfer related to the rejection of applications due to the Canadian Forces Common Enrolment Medical Standards. According to a number of complainants, although the Canadian Forces had found them medically fit for service in the Reserves, in their specific occupation, they were considered unfit for the Regular Force because they did not meet the Canadian Forces Common Enrolment Medical Standards. Complainants contended that, from a medical perspective, their application should be considered in the same way that an Occupational Transfer (i.e., changing from one type of occupation in the Regular Force to another) file was assessed – particularly considering that Reservists are members of the Canadian Forces. In the case of an Occupational Transfer, the applicant should only be required to meet the minimum medical category for the desired occupation rather than the Canadian Forces Common Enrolment Medical Standards.

A number of Reservists also expressed frustration over what they perceived as a lack of support from their Reserve units, including commanding officers that did not support their Component Transfer application, files being lost or misplaced, and a general lack of knowledge regarding the roles and responsibilities of Reserve unit personnel with respect to Component Transfer processing.
Analysis

This review determined that a number of independent factors can contribute to excessive delays in the Component Transfer process. For example, the Verification of Former (military) Service was frequently cited as a major cause of delay. Similarly, invalid security clearances or the need to re-take lapsed tests, such as the Physical Fitness Test, often create delays. In addition, the requirement for a new medical test and/or the retrieval of medical files adds significant time to the process. Even more delays can occur at the Prior Learning Assessment and Recognition phase – the phase at which a member’s existing skills, prior training and experience, are assessed. Another major source of delay involves the requirement for a letter from the commanding officer of the Reservist seeking a transfer to the Regular Force. Indeed, in some instances, Reservists were forced to make repeated requests for a letter from their commanding officer.

In this review, Ombudsman investigators also found that the coordination between some Reserve units and their local Recruiting Centres was haphazard and lacking.

Compounding all of these factors was the apparent lack of a standardized approach to the processing of Component Transfers across the various authorities involved.

It should be noted that, during the course of this review, the Canadian Forces conducted its own internal review of the policies and procedures related to Component Transfers and, on June 17, 2005, released new direction on this issue. Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5002-3 and Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources-Military) Instruction 07/05 together recognize that a member transferring between components is already a member of the Canadian Forces. As a result, redundant processing has been eliminated; relevant military and civilian work experience is recognized; and training differences are de-emphasized by using military work experience versus training as the basis for determining a candidate’s service comparison. These directives also provide new definitions of a skilled applicant; conditions for rank protection; and use of a new Prior Learning Assessment matrix. At the same time, Reservists wishing to apply to the Regular Force now have the option of applying directly to a Recruiting Centre as opposed to having to apply through their Reserve unit commanding officer.

The Canadian face behind the recruiting targets...

A complainant, a Senior Officer with 16 years of service in the Reserves, the first four as a Class “A” (part-time contract) and the last twelve as a Class “B” (full time contract), applied to the Canadian Forces in the fall of 2005, for a Component Transfer from the Reserves to the Regular Force. He stated that when he visited his local Recruit Center, he was informed “that it was more difficult to bring in a Senior Officer than a civilian off the street and that the process could take up to two years.”

Despite already being a Commissioned Officer in the CF with a record of over ten years of working in the Regular Force environment, the complainant was advised that he would be required to undergo the same screening process as anyone else applying to join the Military. As a result he needed to obtain letters of reference from both civilians and his Commanding Officer; complete a full Medical Assessment; and be processed for a Security Clearance.

The complainant advised the Recruiter that he held both a valid CF Medical assessment and CF Express Test qualification, and questioned the requirement for both. He also stated that as a result of his Officer Classification and the work it involved, he held a up to date Top Secret Security Clearance. Regardless, the Recruiter after showing him the appropriate sections in the Recruiters Handbook informed him that he would have to undergo the same screening process as any civilian, before his application for transfer could be processed.

Although extremely discouraged by the lack of acknowledgement of his Reserve experience, and the failure of the Recruit System to recognize his qualifications as an already Commissioned Officer, the complainant continues the Component Transfer process. He expects to be accepted into the Regular Force in the near future.
Summary and Recommendations

This Canadian Forces initiative on Component Transfers is a step in the right direction and it appears to address the issues identified by this review. However, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the measures that have been put in place or to determine whether they will rectify all of the problems identified by Ombudsman investigators.

Recommendation Seven

I recommend that:

The Chief of Military Personnel, the Chief of Reserves and the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group monitor the implementation of these directives rigorously and make adjustments if, and where, necessary to refine them.

Given the significance of this issue, I will be following up on the implementation of this initiative.

Table of Contents


Issue Four – Security
Background

A large number of complaints received by the Office of the Ombudsman during this review involved delays and/or a lack of communication about the security screening process. Complainants described to investigators a number of frustrations involving:

* The basic eligibility criterion of citizenship which must be met (except in the most exceptional circumstances) in order to join the Canadian Forces;
* Delays encountered by Canadian citizens who had been out of the country for extended periods; and
* A general lack of communication (or sometimes miscommunication) from Recruiting Centres regarding the security screening process and, in particular, about the reasons for delays.

The Government of Canada Security Policy requires that all potential employees, including Canadian Forces applicants, undergo a security screening process if their duties may require access to sensitive information and/or assets. Applicants cannot be formally appointed to a position or have access to sensitive information and/or assets until the required screening has been completed successfully.

The National Defence Personnel Security Screening Program is derived from the Government of Canada Security Policy and has three distinct and separate processes:

* The first process is the Enhanced Reliability Check, which all applicants must successfully complete prior to enrolment in the Canadian Forces. The Enhanced Reliability Check assesses whether an applicant can be expected to be reliable and trustworthy in the performance of his or her duties.
* The second process is the Security Clearance Pre-Assessment. This process is conducted for any applicant who, during the recruiting process, makes a verbal or written statement about a history or behaviour which gives rise to a security concern. It is also conducted if there are any international implications related to an applicant. This process must be completed prior to enrolment in the Canadian Forces and can only be conducted for applicants who have successfully completed an Enhanced Reliability Check.
* The third process is the Security Clearance process and it is conducted for all Government of Canada employees, be they military or civilian, after they have received and accepted a position.

The Deputy Provost Marshal Security is responsible for all aspects of the security policy in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces and oversees the certification aspect of the security screening program. Although responsible for the various checks, the Deputy Provost Marshal Security enlists the assistance of outside agencies for support in certain areas, specifically the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for fingerprint identity confirmation and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service for any security clearance background checks required in Canada or abroad.
Analysis

During this review, it became apparent that there is a widespread misperception by many individuals in (and outside) the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces that all applicants are required to complete the Security Clearance process prior to their enrolment in the Canadian Forces. This simply is not the case. Indeed, prior to enrolment, the majority of applicants must only complete an Enhanced Reliability Check, and only under specific circumstances is a Security Clearance Pre-Assessment conducted.

The Enhanced Reliability Check can be completed at local Recruiting Centres with the exception of the criminal records and credit checks, which are conducted by Deputy Provost Marshal Security. If an applicant does not appear on either the Canadian Police Identification Centre or the Credit Bureau of Canada, the Enhanced Reliability Check can be completed in as little as 72 hours. If problems arise with either check, however, this time may be extended considerably.

Unfortunately, the second process – the Security Clearance Pre-Assessment – can take much longer as a result of the types of checks that must be conducted. Deputy Provost Marshal Security and Treasury Board Secretariat officials informed Ombudsman investigators that, depending on the country of origin of an applicant, it can take up to two years for the Security Clearance Pre-Assessment to be completed. Deputy Provost Marshal Security officials have said that they receive good and timely service from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, but noted that the nature of this assessment – including having to retrieve information from foreign governments – can lead to long delays.

I commend the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces on their leadership, as outlined in Operation Connection, in trying to move forward on policy changes meant to increase their target demographics and reduce wait times for applicants with foreign implications. These changes would see the adoption of reduced times for secret and confidential clearances, as well as the elimination of Security Clearance Pre-Assessments for applicants that have only spent time in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and other original North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.

However, there is still significant room for improvement related to the overall security screening program. In particular, based on a number of interviews with front line Recruiting Centre staff, it became apparent that many of them did not fully understand the security screening program or its various components. As a result, they had difficulty explaining the program, including the reasons for lengthy delays, to applicants. This caused a great deal of frustration with many complainants.

The Canadian face behind the recruiting targets...

An individual who had immigrated to Canada (from Africa) in 1998 attempted to join the Canadian Forces. He applied as a landed immigrant at his local Recruiting Centre in the early months of 2001, completing a physical fitness test and a security clearance form.

In 2002, the applicant moved from his original location to another region of the country, and, as a result, had his file transferred to the Recruiting Centre closest to his new home. Approximately seven months later, the applicant was informed that the processing of his file would have to stop, as he had not resided in Canada for the required five years. Although the applicant was disappointed that he had not been advised of this policy when he had initiated his application, his intent was to re-apply after he reached the five-year threshold.

In December 2003, the applicant reached this threshold and he again applied to join the Canadian Forces. As the process unfolded, he was informed by the local Recruiting Centre that he would have re-do the security clearance process and that it could take a year or more to complete.

Having become disillusioned with the process and frustrated with the amount of time that he had already invested and would have to continue to invest, the applicant lost interest in pursuing a career in the Canadian Forces.
Summary and Recommendations

Generally speaking, the Government of Canada Security Policy and the National Defence Personnel Security Screening Program are necessary instruments of government. That being said, this review has determined that inordinate delays related to the implementation of these policies/programs is leading to skilled and talented Canadians quitting the military recruiting process. Although some delays may be unavoidable, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces have made some progress in addressing these challenges as part of Operation Connection. I am also aware that Treasury Board Secretariat is currently reviewing the Government of Canada Security Policy.

Recommendation Eight

I recommend that:

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces assess the feasibility of extending or expanding the measures taken as part of Operation Connection to reduce and/or eliminate delays in the security screening process.

As a result of this review, it was also determined that some delays related to the security screening process may be the result of a lack of information (or misinformation) at the Recruiting Centre staff level regarding the overall security policy/program and its various components. Most notable is the widespread belief that applicants are required to complete the Security Clearance process prior to their enrolment in the Canadian Forces. In order to minimize delays wherever possible, Recruiting Centre staff must understand thoroughly all aspects and requirements of the security screening process.

Recommendation Nine

I recommend that:

All Recruiting Centre staff be provided with an appropriate level of training and information on the Government of Canada Security Policy, the National Defence Personnel Security Screening Program, and all aspects (and components) of the security screening process.

This training will also assist Recruiting Centre staff in informing applicants, in a clear and understandable fashion, of the security requirements that they will be expected meet, including the documentation that will be required by the Department and the Canadian Forces in the processing of applications. Beyond this, Recruiting Centre staff should maintain regular contact with applicants and inform them on a timely basis if their supporting documentation is incomplete.

Ultimately, given the nature of the security screening process, it is clear the some delays in particular areas or for particular applicants will be unavoidable. In these cases, and in keeping with previous recommendations, Recruiting Centre staff must communicate with applicants on an ongoing basis and seek to establish reasonable expectations on the part of the applicant. For example, if documents about a particular applicant are required from a country that is known to be slow in responding to such requests, this fact should be included as part of the expectation-setting exercise. This may also provide applicants with the opportunity to assist the Department and the Canadian Forces in obtaining required documentation.

Recommendation Ten

I recommend that:

The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group develop standard procedures for informing applicants of the security screening process, including providing a reasonable assessment as to how long the process will take for each individual applicant.

Table of Contents


Issue Five – Medical
Background

Of the 301 complaints examined during this review of the recruiting system, 96 specifically identified concerns with the medical review process. These concerns covered a variety of issues; however, the most common was the length of time taken to review an applicant’s medical file. In some cases, these delays resulted in individual applicants missing deadlines for specific occupational selection boards. This meant that some potentially successful applicants had their enrolment in the Canadian Forces delayed. For others, the resulting frustration caused them to lose interest in a career in the Canadian Forces.
Analysis

All Canadian Forces applicants must meet the Common Enrolment Medical Standards. The decision to accept or reject an applicant from a medical perspective is based on a review of the combined results of his or her physical examination, medical history, and a medical questionnaire completed by the candidate. If an applicant is rejected outright due to a pre-existing medical condition, they are provided with a letter outlining the reasons for the rejection, as well as information on how to appeal that decision. If an applicant’s file requires additional information, they are provided with a letter detailing what information is required and why.

When all relevant medical information is collected from the applicant, the local Recruiting Centre forwards it on to the Recruit Medical Staff located at Canadian Forces Base Borden (now relocated in Ottawa) for review and a final decision on the applicant’s suitability. This review must be completed prior to an applicant being enrolled in the Canadian Forces. The requirement to have all medical files reviewed by a central staff is in place to ensure that the same standard is applied to all applicants.

On average, the process of collecting the required information, forwarding it to the Recruit Medical Staff at NDHQ Director Medical Policy conducting the review, and informing the local Recruiting Centre of the results takes up to six weeks. And, if additional information is required, this process can take even longer. As applicants cannot be enrolled until this process is finished, some potential candidates missed their occupational selection board and found themselves in a state of limbo. This caused many to quit the recruiting process altogether.

In an attempt to accelerate the medical screening portion of the recruiting process, the Canadian Forces recently introduced two new initiatives.

The first, announced on 20 May 2005 by Canadian Forces General Message (CANFORGEN) 097/05, gives individual Recruiting Centres the authority to enrol applicants who meet all other enrolment requirements, and who successfully pass their medical parts one and two. With this, the requirement to wait for a complete review of applicants’ medical files by the Recruit Medical Staff has been eliminated. Although the medical files are still reviewed, an applicant with no apparent medical issues can now be enrolled while that review is being conducted3. This new process creates a small risk that some applicants may be enrolled even though they are medically unsuitable; however, for the majority of applicants the process is more efficient and timely.

The second initiative involved the move of the Recruit Medical Staff from Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Headquarters at CFB Borden to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa as part of the Director of Medical Policy, answering ultimately to the Commander of Canadian Forces Health Services.

Senior staff within Canadian Forces Health Services believe this move will increase their ability to respond to requests from the recruiting system, resulting in a decrease in the average medical review period.

3. In the event that an applicant is determined to be medically unfit after part three of the medical review, he or she is released from the Canadian Forces without prejudice under Queen’s Regulations and Orders (QR&O) 15.01 item 5(e): Irregular Enrolment.
Summary and Recommendations

The requirement to have all medical files reviewed by a centralized medical staff provides a measure of standardization and, ultimately, fairness. It ensures that the same standards will be applied to all applicants regardless of where they are processed. However, it also raises concerns about timeliness.

The recent change authorizing the enrolment of applicants prior their medical review being finalized is welcomed and may decrease overall wait times. However, the new policy has not been in place long enough for this review to make a definitive assessment.

Likewise, this review cannot assess the benefits (or problems) associated with the move of the Recruit Medical Staff to National Defence Headquarters or their altered reporting chain of command. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that delays have been reduced, it is too early to draw any conclusions.

In order to ensure that the new organizational structure is effective, the Chief of Military Personnel must rigorously monitor and assess the situation. To do that, performance measures must be developed, implemented and analyzed on an ongoing basis.

Recommendation Eleven

I recommend that:

The Chief of Military Personnel develop, implement and analyze performance measures to determine the effectiveness of communications and cooperation between the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group and Canadian Forces Health Services and, ultimately, the impact that this arrangement has on the military recruiting system.

Table of Contents


Issue Six – Recruit Allowances
Background

As part of this review, Ombudsman investigators received a number of complaints related to recruiting allowances, particularly the ‘Civilian Trade Qualification Allowance’. Complainants claimed that the incentive that was paid to them after the completion of all required training was smaller than that which had originally been offered at the time of their enrolment.

Recruiting allowances are governed by Treasury Board policy and are specific to military occupations that are designated ‘under-strength’. These allowances offer either a rank and/or monetary incentive to qualified applicants enrolling in the Canadian Forces. They were implemented to attract pre-qualified individuals to the Canadian Forces, thus reducing the amount of time that they would normally spend in initial occupational training. There are three specific programs offered:

* Post-secondary Diploma or Certificate: Up to $10,000 can be awarded to eligible applicants who possess a designated academic qualification – a college diploma in specified studies or a technical certificate from an academic institution – that would allow them to bypass most, or all, of the initial occupation training in one of the designated under strength military occupations of their choice.
* Civilian Trade Qualification: Up to $20,000 can be awarded to applicants who have earned a civilian trade-qualified federal or provincial ‘ticket’ that is equivalent to the advanced occupational training (at least qualification level 5), thus allowing them to bypass initial occupation training.
* Military Occupation Qualification: Up to $20,000 is available to Regular Force re-enrolees or Reserve Force members who undertake a component transfer into any one of the designated under strength military occupations.

Analysis

Once a year, all military occupations are reviewed to determine their relative ‘health’ or ‘strength’ based on previous attrition projections. Occupations that are considered ‘distressed’ (i.e., with no hope of recovery through the normal recruiting process) are considered for recruiting allowances under the Compensation and Benefit Instructions.

After the Chief of the Defence Staff approves the final list of occupations that are eligible for recruiting allowances, a Canadian Forces General Message is released (normally in the March timeframe) announcing the occupations and classifications that are eligible for an allowance in the following fiscal year; the qualifications that are required to receive an allowance; and the compensation that each eligible candidate is to be awarded. This policy remains in effect for one year, from 1 April until 31 March the following year, and does not change during that period. The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group then communicates this information to Recruiting Centres across the country who are responsible for informing any potential applicants.

If an individual applicant’s recruiting process spans two fiscal years, however, the allowance provided to that applicant may change considerably. For example, if an applicant started the recruiting process in December 2005 but was not formally enrolled into the Canadian Forces until May 2006, the applicant would only be eligible for the allowance that was promulgated in March 2006 – months after the applicant started the process. And, if adjustments were made in the intervening period, this may not be the same allowance that attracted the applicant to the Canadian Forces in the first place; indeed, it may be smaller or potentially even non-existent.

During this review, Chief of Military Personnel staff recognized this inequity. And, significantly, grievances involving this issue are now being resolved in the favour of the applicant/Canadian Forces member. At the same time, the policy is being reviewed with a view to protecting an applicant’s eligibility to an allowance based on the application date and not the enrolment date.

As noted throughout this report, effective communication between Recruiting Centre staff and military applicants is essential to the success of the overall recruiting system and to ensuring that quality applicants do not quit the process. Unfortunately, in the case of recruiting allowances, this communication has not been effective. Indeed, Ombudsman investigators have determined that recruiting allowances are poorly understood by Recruiting Centre staff and, consequently, by applicants. Moreover, there is limited information available to potential applicants on the specific administration of these allowances, apart from some very general facts on the Canadian Forces recruiting website.

The Canadian face behind the recruiting targets...

In 2002, after learning about a recruiting allowance of $20,000 plus an advanced rank being offered by the Canadian Forces, the complainant applied to join the military. A licensed diesel truck mechanic with several other qualifications deemed desirable by the Canadian Forces, he successfully completed the application process in November 2002. He was given a conditional offer of employment at that point and was informed that he would receive the rank of corporal and $20,000 after completing all of the required training.

However, from November 2002 until May 2003, while he was waiting for his Basic Recruit Training, this offer changed three times: initially it changed to Private 3rd Class and $20,000; then to Private 3rd Class and $10,000; and, finally, to Private with no monetary compensation.

In April 2003, the Recruiting Centre explained that the complainant had missed the deadline for the specific bonus for which he was qualified and recommended that he take the offer and file a grievance after completing his Basic Recruit Training. At no time previous to this had anyone at the Recruiting Centre informed the complainant that there had been a deadline or that it affected his allowance offer. At this stage, the complainant, who had already given up his civilian employment, accepted the offer.

In August 2003, at his graduation ceremony from Basic Recruit Training, the complainant was presented with an offer in French, (which he did not understand) and was advised that it was his allowance – Private 3rd Class but no compensation. After accepting the offer, however, he actually received $10,000 but no rank compensation. From May 2004 to July 2004, the complainant completed his Basic Trades Training and was subsequently posted to an operational base. With the full support of his chain of command, he submitted a grievance and, as a result, received the full $20,000 and the rank of corporal in June 2005.

After requesting his personnel file, he discovered a letter that stated “that as he had community college vice trade papers he was not entitled to receive the bonus that he had initially been offered.” This was never explained to him by anyone at his Recruiting Centre.
Summary and Recommendations

As a result of this review, it became evident that some Canadian Forces Recruiting Group staff are unfamiliar with the regulations associated with the Recruit Allowance Program. In order to maintain credibility with applicants and prevent unnecessary frustration, military recruiters must be able to provide applicants with accurate and up-to-date information on the program. Moreover, it is essential that all Recruiting Centre staff that have contact with applicants (not just Military Career Councillors) have the ability to answer questions concerning the Recruit Allowance Program.

Recommendation Twelve

I recommend that:

The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group develop a current information distribution process that ensures that all Recruiting Centre staff have easy access to the latest information regarding the Recruit Allowance Program.

On a more substantive level, the inequity that currently exists in the awarding of allowances must be rectified. For instance, under the current policy if an individual commences the recruiting process prior to April 1st of any given year but is not formally enrolled until after that date, and the allowance changes, that individual could receive a different level of compensation than was advertised at the start of the process. Although the grievance system is currently dealing with these instances in a positive manner, it is clear that the policy must be changed to avoid the loss of potential recruits due to frustration. And this inequity must be resolved in a way that favours the applicant (except where it is clear that the delay is directly attributable to the applicant).

Recommendation Thirteen

I recommend that:

The present policy of awarding a recruit allowance based on the date when an applicant is enrolled be amended to reflect the date when the application is received by a Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre with all supporting documentation.

At the same time, fairness dictates that should the recruit allowance increase (or be instituted) after a qualified individual has applied to join the Canadian Forces but before that individual is actually enrolled, the individual should receive the higher allowance. This is meant to avoid a situation where two applicants are enrolled at the same time but are provided different recruit allowances.

Recommendation Fourteen

I recommend that:

The present policy include a provision that, should a recruit allowance increase (or be instituted) after a qualified individual has applied to join the Canadian Forces but before that individual is actually enrolled, then the individual should receive the new (higher) allowance.

Ultimately, it is imperative that any potential recruit completely understands what he or she is being offered by the Canadian Forces under the Recruit Allowance Program. Accurate, timely and understandable communication in this regard is critical.

Recommendation Fifteen

I recommend that:

All offers of a recruit allowance (including relevant terms and conditions) be provided to applicants in writing, and in very clear and easily understood terms.

Table of Contents


Issue Seven – Reserve Issues
Background

The recruiting process for the Regular Force is different in many ways from that which exists for the Reserves. For the Regular Force, the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group and their associated Recruiting Centres are responsible for all aspects of the recruiting process. In the case of the Reserves, however, local Reserve units are responsible for attraction, compiling applicant files for processing (by local Recruiting Centres), offers of employment and enrolment. Local Recruiting Centres administer the Canadian Forces Aptitude Test, candidate interviews, medical assessments and physical testing.

In order to understand the key differences between the Reserve and Regular Force recruiting process, Ombudsman investigators interviewed a variety of Reserve recruiters across the country. What they found was a lack of standardization and a general inconsistency of approaches and procedures used across the three environments throughout Canada, and even within the same environment.
Analysis

The review determined that the Air Force Reserve does very little active recruiting, relying instead on recruiting former or retiring Regular Force members. And, in the majority of cases, Air Force Reservists are integrated directly into Regular Force units. Even those units composed of Reservists are usually employed as support to the Regular Force.

For its part, the Navy uses a centralized approach to recruiting Reserves, with the Naval Reserve Headquarters in Quebec City controlling the activity. Naval Reserve Headquarters determines the number of Reserve recruits that are required in each occupation and these numbers, in turn, are used to calculate the target recruit numbers by trade for each Naval Reserve Division. Naval Reserve Headquarters also provides funding to each division to employ one full-time Class “B” recruiter throughout the year. Although there appears to be no Naval Reserve-wide standard operating procedure, every division that was interviewed has produced procedures that take into account the uniqueness of the area from which they recruit. Finally, Naval Reserve Headquarters conducts a yearly recruiters seminar, bringing together all Naval recruiters to discuss the issues that they face.

The recruiting of Reservists in the Army is approached differently by each Land Force Area command (i.e.,four Areas, in the West, Central Canada, in Quebec and in the East). Although there are similarities in approach between the Areas, there is no Army-wide coordination. Area Commands determine the number of recruits that are required based on the amount of funding that is available and the input that is received from their various subordinate Brigade Headquarters. Although the Area Commands have all produced a set of recruiting operating procedures for their Area, the responsibility for recruiting has been delegated to the Brigade Headquarters and there is little commonality across the country.

Throughout the review, the most consistent concern raised by Reserve recruiters, regardless of their environment or location, centred on their inability to communicate with their local Recruiting Centre during their training evenings, which is when the majority of recruiters actually conduct their recruiting. Indeed, the issue of communications between Reserve recruiters and local Recruiting Centres, or the lack of communications at times, was one of the most frequent complaints.
Summary and Recommendations

The ad hoc system currently in place for Reserve recruiting is neither efficient nor do I believe it adequate to meet the needs of the Canadian Forces. Given the current operational demands on Canada’s military both at home and abroad, it is absolutely crucial to have a Reserve Force that can shoulder more of the burden. And, to do that, thousands of Reserves must be recruited.

Although there are some very good practices in place to recruit Reservists, there is significant room for improvement. It is clear that the most pressing need is for the development of a National Reserve Recruiting Policy and, flowing from that, the creation of national standard operating procedures. The development and implementation of a National Reserve Recruiting Policy, while allowing for differences in the way in which the environments employ Reserves, would address the many inconsistencies (as well as the clear inefficiencies) that currently exist across the country.

Recommendation Sixteen

I recommend that:

The Chief of Military Personnel, in consultation with the Chief of Reserves and the other various stakeholders, develop and implement a National Reserve Recruiting Policy. While establishing national goals and procedures, this policy must also recognize the unique requirements of the various Reserve elements.

It became evident during this review that communications between some Recruiting Centres and the Reserve units that they serve is far less than optimal. As detailed earlier, it is imperative that Recruiting Centres become more ‘client focused’ in their operations, including in their approach to Regular Force applicants and to Reserve units. In order to ensure effective communications and dealings between local Recruiting Centres and Reserve units, standard operating procedures, including service level standards, need to be developed, taking into account the requirements and priorities of both.

Recommendation Seventeen

I recommend that:

The Chief of Military Personnel, the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group and the other various stakeholders involved in the Reserve recruiting process develop and implement standard operating procedures, including service level standards, in this area.

In developing standard operating procedures, it is clear that Recruiting Centres must be more available and accessible to Regular Force applicants and Reserve recruiters. The Canadian Forces may lose the services of skilled Canadians if those Canadians find it difficult to contact their local Recruiting Centres (which may be the case if they can only be contacted during regular working hours). At the same time, potential Reservists may grow frustrated with delays that may result from poor communications between Recruiting Centres and local Reserve units.

Recommendation Eighteen

I recommend that:

That the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group develop a Standard Operating procedure that would allow access to Recruiting Centres outside the normal business working hours. This would allow access to applicants who work full time. Consideration should be given to have recruiting centres open during evenings to coincide with Reserve Units hours, in order to facilitate contacts in processing their candidates.